Vissel Kobe in 2019 — A Tactical Review
Since returning to the J league in 2014, Vissel Kobe haven’t finished higher than 7th place in the league. With e-commerce giants, Rakuten, taking over the club, there has been a somewhat process of ‘Barcafication’. This has seen the arrival of the ‘VIP trio’ of Andreas Iniesta, David Villa and Lukas Podolski as well as other well-known international players. Going into the 2019 season, there was high hopes with Juan Manuel Lillo as head coach. The Spaniard is well known for his aesthetic view of the game, as well as having an impact on Pep Guardiola before he began his coaching career.
The league season did not go as well as expected, finishing 8th in the final standings. Lillo departed the club in the midst of a 7 game losing run. Takayuki Yoshida came in on an interim basis until the German, Thorsten Fink was hired in June. While their league position was that of a middling team, the season ended in success as they won their first ever trophy, the Emperor’s Cup, ensuring they qualified for the group stages of the AFC Champions League. At the start of the 2020 season, they added to their trophy haul by winning the Japanese Super Cup in a penalty shootout against Yokohama F Marinos.
There were a number of key themes that ran throughout the season for all of Vissel’s coaches. This revolved around how the team could implement a possession-based style and create goal-scoring chances. However, the challenge of this was how to commit players higher up the pitch without being left vulnerable in transitions and to counter attacks. This is something that all 3 coaches (Lillo, Yoshida & Fink) had to deal with throughout the season and did so and varying ways. The build-up and attacking structures will be focused on throughout the article.
Throughout the season, Vissel Kobe would play a variety of formations with numerous variations. These would often revolve around a 4–3–3, 3–4–3 or 3–5–2. These variations were mainly based around the individual qualities of the available players, as well managing the negative transitions, leaving them vulnerable to counter attacks (which will be discussed later).
With regards to their possession-based approach, Vissel’s average possession per game of 57.9% ranks them second in the league, acquiring 60% possession or higher in 15 of their 34 games (only 4 times did they go below 50%). the below graph is also useful in showcasing significant areas in which Vissel possess the ball and attack. The graph on the left highlights how possession is higher in wide areas high up the pitch. Of interest is how their possession of the ball in central areas, particularly midfield, is higher than the league average, suggesting a team that would be able to maintain possession well in central areas of the pitch
As a note, below is the matches throughout the 2019 season that were watched and will be used for this article. All these games can be found on Footballia:
MD1 v Cerezo Osaka (a)
MD 2 v Sagan Tosu (h)
MD13 v Shonan Bellmare (h)
MD15 v FC Tokyo (a)
Friendly v FC Barcelona (h)
MD24 v Sagan Tosu (a)
MD34 v Jubilo Iwata (h)
Structure of the Defence in Build-Up
Based on the style of play that Vissel were looking to achieve, there was a demand for the central defenders to be able to build up attacks with their ball-playing qualities. Using Leo Osaki and the Brazilian, Dankler, Vissel were able to do this in a defensive back 4. In MD2 v Sagan Tosu, With both able to carry the ball forward with ease, they were also able to play penetrative passes through their respective sides half spaces. This however, was done in two different variations, due to both being right footed (right footed Osaki playing as a left-sided centre back).
From the left side, Leo Osaki uses a vertical pass to penetrate through the left half space to Iniesta. This comes after first progressing the ball past the first line via a dribble. From the right, Dankler Penetrates through the right half space with diagonal penetration into the feet of David Villa. The players in wide positions (Daigo Nishi in this example) are then able to combine and penetrate the Sagan defensive line.
Following a 7-game losing streak, and Lillo leaving his post as head coach, Takayuki Yoshida sought to add more defensive solidity to the team, opting for a for a 5-man defence. With Vissel maintaining a large amount of possession in games (60.8% v Shonan in MD13), this would often look more like a 3-man defence. In his post-match comments for the Shonan game, Yoshida mentioned the use of 3 central defenders was to reduce the amount of defensive responsibility each player had:
‘With three centre-backs, each player has to defend a smaller space, so they are able to challenge opponents with more confidence. Even when one player moves out of position, there are still two players there to cover, so I think it helps our players.’
While aiding the defensive work for each player and reducing the impact of the negative transition on the defence, the change of shape also allowed them to be position in such a way to be effective in progressing the ball.
The first variation in the 3 central defenders was the positioning of the CB and LCB. Dankler would take up his usual wide position in the right half space, while Osaki (as the central of the 3) would position in the left half space, more preferable for his quality to penetrate via carrying the ball or passing. This left Daiki Miya to position somewhat as a left back. This was beneficial in that it allowed the wing back (Keijiro Ogawa) to position higher, whilst also allowing better access to penetrate via the left side.
The other variation was what would be expected when building up with a 3-man defence. Osaki positioning centrally between the 2 wider centre backs. This still offered options in progressing the ball, Dankler from the right with diagonal penetration into the striker (Wellington) and Miya with the option to move the ball forward into either the left half space or left wing.
With Thorsten Fink in charge, in his first game he decided on a 4-man defensive line. The central defenders (Osaki and Miya) would position wide in the half spaces, similar to previous games in which Vissel had deployed 4 at the back. To help protect the defence from potential counter attacks and assist the build up, the two deepest midfielders (Iniesta & Hotaru Yamaguchi) would position closely in front of the centre backs. This created a 4v2 overload around the Tokyo’s two forwards, whilst also allowing the full backs to position higher and support the attack.
Also of note when the deeper positioning of Iniesta in midfield. As confirmed by Fink, this was to aid in the build up phase:
‘Andres is a player who can play anywhere, but today I put him in a lower position to help build up. It was in the plan because he could look forward and create many opportunities.’
The versatility of the two midfield players also allowed for the creation of a 3-chain defensive line through the positioning of one of these players. This allowed for the centre backs to position slightly wider and allow access with the ball to the wing, the half space or a diagonal pass into the centre.
Fink continued to use 3 central defenders through the season, and with the signing of Hiroki Iikura, was able to have a goalkeeper who could facilitate the build up through his positioning. Iikura could position in such as way whew he would become an additional player in the defensive line during build up. The effect this had on the structure was that while 2 of the centre backs would position in the half space, the third centre back would position wide enough that their role would be similar to that of a full back. Iikura would then position centrally between the two ‘split’ centre backs. The examples below show how this occurred on the right (for Dankler) and left (for Vermaelen).
The use of 3 central defenders carried into the final game of the season. Playing against Jubilo’s 4–4–2 shape, the use of the 3 helped position around the pressure of two forwards and allowed ease in progressing the ball. In the early stages of the game, with little pressure from the forwards, Leo Osaki could move into the midfield line to receive the ball, allowing an additional forward option to aid in progressing the ball forward. This movement could also be supported by the dropping movement of one of the midfielders to change the dynamic of the defensive line in build up.
Osaki would also use his ball-playing qualities to provoke pressure from the forwards and provide more space for the midfielders (particularly Sergi Samper) to receive in. In the example, he carries the ball just enough to cause the forwards to close on him. At the right moment, he is able to play the ball to Samper who now has additional time and space to make the next pass. The Jubilo Iwata centre midfielder also has to leave his position with good access to Samper in order to attempt to block the potential vertical pass, knowing Osaki’s ball playing qualities.
The structure of the back 3 eventually forced one of Jubilo’s midfielders into the first line of pressure. This would often be either of the wide midfielders, dependant on the location of the ball. If the wide midfielder went to pressure, then the wing back would become available to receive, and could advance the ball in either the wide area or playing centrally due to the shifting movements of the remaining midfield line. If a central midfielder would make these forward movements, then a defender such as Dankler would use his quality in diagonal penetration to play forward into one of the midfielders.
Attacking Structure
Often having large amounts of possession, and having the ‘VIP trio’ of Iniesta, Villa and Podolski, there was always a demand for the team to be an attacking threat and look to create a large numbers of scoring chances. Over the course of the 2019 season. Kobe ranked 2nd in the league for goals, 3rd in expected goals (50.13xG) and 3rd in number of shots over 0.2xG (70, 14.6%). Interestingly, the disparity between their xG and total goals (59) was the largest in the league (+8.87), suggesting an over performing attack.
For the first game of the season, Lillo opted to use Iniesta as a false 9. Being one of the most capable players within the Vissel team, he often used dropping movements to help create overloads and maintain possession of the ball within the first and second phases. While this helped generate considerable possession of the ball (61.2%), this often created scenarios where they had few to no options to progress the ball and penetrate opposition lines.
A lack of complimentary movements between the forwards and midfield with respect to Iniesta’s dropping movements often lead to 0v3 situations against Cerezo’s defensive line. This was taken to an almost extreme fashion in some scenarios, where at times 8 players were behind Cerezo’s first line of pressure. Only Villa and Podolski were forward options on their respective wings.
With Iniesta playing as a false 9 and dropping into midfield frequently, Vissel’s attacks were reliant on the use of both wingers, Villa and Podolski. Both were consistent on either side, occupying wide positions and once receiving, using combinations and dribbling to invert towards the unoccupied central space. The wingers were also supported by vertical movements of the full backs, overlapping to allow a combination in the wide space or to facilitate the inverting movements of the winger.
With Iniesta’s movements to create overloads and be involved in play, this often created situations where an overload in a wide area was used to progress the ball, but would ultimately be fruitless due to the lack of any players in central attacking areas.
In his post-match comments, Lillo stated the intention of Iniesta as the forward with Villa and Podolski on the wings was to try and draw Cerezo’s defenders out of position:
‘Our aim was to have Iniesta positioned away from the opponent central defenders, who had to be concerned with the runs from Villa and Podolski. It was intended to shift the attack from the outside into the middle, drawing the opponent in. […] We believe the positioning of Villa and Podolski created opportunities for others. However, it is a shame that it did not result in any goals.’
In the next game, this idea was scrapped. David Villa was deployed as the the central forward, with Lukas Podolski beginning on the right and Kyogo Furuhashi on the left. The benefit was that now with a focal point in possession, Vissel were able to play with a greater sense of verticality as well as having a player who could add a level of versatility in an attacking sense.
This was showcased in numerous ways. The biggest difference between the previous game was that now with Villa as the central forward, Vissel were now able to play with greater depth. Where previously Iniesta as the false 9 would have used dropping movements to combine and be involved in the possession of the ball, Villa instead would look to move in a way that could penetrate the opposition defensive and be in a position to receive with the option to then shoot. An example of this can be seen with the only goal of the game v Sagan. With Yamaguchi in possession of the ball, Villa immediately looks to add depth in order to receive the ball beyond the defensive line. While he does not receive the ball, he is fortunate in that the ball deflects off the defender into his path, where he is able to convert and give Vissel the lead.
It should also be noted that another benefit of Villa adding depth when in possession is the additional space afforded to the wingers and Iniesta in midfield. With the defensive players pinned by Villa, forcing them into defensive movements towards their own goal, the space then becomes greater between Sagan’s defensive and midfield lines. This is particularly beneficial to Iniesta, who flourishes in these spaces, particularly in the left half space.
A common theme as the season progressed was how Vissel would commit 5 (and sometimes 6) players to attack. As Michael Cox’s observes in his athletic article, almost all top-level teams will look to have a player positioned in all 5 vertical zones (left wing, left half space, centre, right half space, right wing). This is done in order to emphasise the coverage of the width of the pitch, attempting to stretch the opposition’s defensive line and allow opportunities to attack through central and wide areas, dependant on the reaction of the opposition. This can only be done if a sufficient amount of players are able to commit forwards an attack. By using less players in build-up, more players can be deployed in an attacking sense.
In the game v Shonan Bellmare, the use of a 3-man defensive line in build-up meant the wing backs were able to be positioned almost as wingers, with 2 central midfielders positioned to allow for ‘resting defence’. This wide positioning allowed the wingers to position in their respective half spaces and make inverted movements towards the centre.
This was also allowed for more complimentary movements between the forwards. David Villa was also able to explain how his positioning on the left was also benefited by the movements and combinations of Wellington:
‘I think I had more space than before playing on the left. Wellington also made good movements in the middle to draw defenders, which allowed me to operate more freely.’
These combinations between Villa and Wellington were also used in the game v FC Tokyo on match day 15. A variation from previous games in this season, both David Villa and Wellington were used in central positions. This was beneficial in attack as both players were able to compliment each other with their movements. In the below example, when Leo Osaki was in possession, David Villa uses penetrative movements to offer the option of a pass behind Tokyo’s defensive line. Wellington compliments this by either holding his position or dropping to use the additional space to receive and combine with either Villa or the wider players. The structure of 6 attackers can also be seen in this example. Wellington’s deeper position was also beneficial in receiving long passes. His aerial ability allowed him to win balls and provide flick ons to Villa, or to combine with wide players.
These complimentary movements were not just seen between these two players. The cohesiveness of movements could also be seen between the wide players and the central midfielders with the central forward. In the game v Jubilo Iwata (match day 34), David Villa’s movements as the central forward were also used in a complimentary way by Yamaguchi. With Villa moving diagonally away from goal towards wide space, his marker tracked his movements. This created open space for Yamaguchi to make a penetrating movement, although he was unable to convert.
The inverting movements of the wingers to try and penetrate also allowed for the wing backs to advance and receive. In the below examples, Podolski’s diagonal movement to penetrate caused the full back to track him, and through the timing of his movement, Daigo Nishi was able to use the space to receive the ball from Samper. This was also reciprocal in that Nishi could position within the half space and make the diagonal movement to penetrate, creating space wide for Podolski to receive the ball and look to invert through his dribbling.
Throughout the season, even with the revolving door of coaches, the challenges for all were the same, how can we play a possession-based style similar to that of Barcelona, while not being vulnerable in defence and being open on the counter attack? All 3 coaches throughout the season tried different tactical strategies, and while there were some consistencies, they were unable to convert them into consistent league performances.
Notes: Quotes from players and coaching staff come from Vissel Kobe’s official site. The quotes are translated from Japanese to English so the opinion of the individuals may not be articulated correctly.
Stats used within the article come from Football LAB. there website can be found here.